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In this paper, the author explores how institutional arrangements influence 
employees’ wages. Particularly, the focus of this study is to distinguish the different 
paths seniority-earnings profiles follow depending on whether the individual is 
employed in a workplace where trade unions and collective bargaining are present 
and/or where formal wage scale rules are adopted. The findings suggest some quite 
interesting patterns. Overall, it appears that senior workers, compared to their 
junior colleagues, are better off when covered by formal incremental scales, since 
seniority wage profiles are estimated to be steeper in these jobs. Furthermore, as the 
results imply, formal wage rules are more likely to be adopted in workplaces with 
union representation. Nevertheless, there are indications that seniority plays a 
significant role even in union jobs with no such scales rules. One possible 
explanation may be that unwritten policies, which actually serve the same purposes 
as formal rules, are quite likely to be adopted in these union jobs. Occupational 
expertise, on the other hand, is highly rewarded in less restricted or structured 
environments, where individual productivity can be measured. The analysis implies 
that in jobs with no formal incremental scales, and especially in the non-union 
sector, employees’ wages are determined by their competitive accumulated 
occupation-specific skills, rather than their seniority. In conclusion, workplaces 
with union representation and seniority-earnings policies “favour and protect” their 
senior employees, while the more competitive non-union sector jobs are fairer in the 
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Numerous studies in the literature have examined the significance of seniority on 
the wage determination process. Job tenure, either due to unobserved individual and 
job-match characteristics reflected in the duration of the job match (Abraham and 
Farber 1987; Altonji and Shakotko 1987) or due to the acquisition of firm-specific 
human capital (Topel 1991), appears to have a positive impact on earnings. The 
purpose of this paper is to extend this knowledge and explore whether there is any 
interaction between institutional arrangements and workplace policies on 
individuals’ earnings profiles, giving a particular attention to seniority. More 
specifically, the author wishes to examine whether there are different seniority-
earnings paths when a trade union is present or when formal wage incremental 
policies exist in the workplace. The innovation of this paper is that it is based on a 
more detailed description of the different, accumulated in-work kinds of skills that 
basically decompose acquired human capital beyond the conventional practice of 
dividing skills between firm-specific and general labour market skills. Furthermore, 
here we use British panel data covering the last decade of the twentieth century, a 
period of time well after the hostile legislation towards unionism (end of 1970s) and 
just before the introduction of a national minimum wage (April 1999). We believe it 
is of great interest to examine the role of unions and their effect on earnings in the 
modern British labour market and to explore how trade unions adjusted to this new 
era. 
 
The British labour market since the late 1970s has experienced many significant 
changes concerning employees’ representation in the workplace. Restrictive 
legislation and less friendly managerial attitudes towards trade unions among other 
developments led to the weakening of unionism through the derecognition of such 
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workers’ associations in existing establishments, the creation of new workplaces 
where trade unions were not particularly popular, or supported and the decline in 
union membership. Consequently, the proportion of the workforce covered by 
collective bargaining shrunk and, in line with the decline in membership strength, 
union influence over pay setting has waned even where the institution continues to 
exist. Union membership declined by over 5 million in the two decades after the 
1979 zenith of 13 million. In addition the proportion of workers covered by a 
collective agreement fell from 71 per cent in 1984 to 51 percent in 1990 and to 35 
per cent in 1997. The wage premium that individuals covered by collective 
contracts traditionally used to enjoy over the workers who were not covered has 
effectively evaporated by the end of the 1990s. For men the wage premium fell from 
9 per cent in 1991 to zero in 1999, while for women, it fell from 16 per cent to 10 
per cent over the eight years (Machin, 2002). Although, trade unions in nowadays 
appear to be less able to extract concessions from employers and the union wage 
premium may be nearly extinct, still workers’ unions and collective contracts 
continue to be strongly associated with lower levels of earnings inequality than the 
non-union sector (Metcalf et al., 2001).  
 
Despite the fact that the impact of trade unions on economic performance has been 
restricted in recent years, unions still wield ‘the sword of justice’ in the workplace. It 
is a stylised fact that pay dispersion among unionised workers is lower than the 
spread among their non-union counterparts. Trade unions even now sustain their 
traditional role as defenders of egalitarian pay structures in the organised sector 
(Machin, 1997). This is achieved through three avenues identified in the literature: 
(a) within establishments (b) across workplaces and firms and (c) across the whole 
pay distribution. Unions reduce wage dispersion within establishments via two 
operational rules. First, they prefer a single wage rate for each occupational group 
whereas in workplaces with no representation and collective contracts supervisors 
decide pay levels within a range. Second, unionised workplaces make more use of 
objective criteria, like seniority, in setting pay rather than subjective factors, like 
individual merit, preferred in non-union establishments. Union representatives 
prefer reduced pay differentials within an establishment for three main reasons:  
1.  They are concerned about favouritism and discrimination in the workplace, 
therefore they opt for impartial objective standards where pay goes with the job. 
2.  In a median voter framework of union representation, since median pay is less 
than mean pay in nearly all firms, we should expect that over half of the 
employees will favour redistribution towards the lower paid.    3
3.  Workers’ solidarity is likely to strengthen when they receive similar wage rates. 
 
The pursuit of wage standardisation by trade unions narrows pay dispersion within 
the organised sector as well. Two arguments that provide reasoning for this 
phenomenon (Freeman and Medoff, 1984) are that, first of all, employers and 
workers of firms competing in the same market can be expected to favour a 
standard rate. On the one hand, an employer does not want a labour contract that is 
more expensive than its competitors. And on the other hand, it secures workers’ pay 
from any undercutting, since essentially it takes wages out of competition. 
Furthermore, union solidarity may be at stake if some workers are paid notably 
more than others for the same job. The decentralisation of bargaining from national 
multi-employer agreements to firm or workplace agreements, especially in the 
private sector, and the privitisation during the last two decades (British Petroleum, 
British Aerospace, British Telecom, gas water, electricity and the railways) may have 
increased the dispersion of pay in the organised sector. Nevertheless, continuing 
union recognition should prevent pay dispersion widening to the extent that we 
observe in the non-unionised sector. Finally, trade unions reduce inequality across 
the whole pay distribution by the enforcement of a de facto wage floor for covered 
jobs, i.e. by truncating the bottom tail of their pay distribution. The introduction 
though of a national minimum wage (NMW) legislation (April 1999) may 
undermine collective bargaining where it exists and effectively reduce the role of 
trade unions in the future1.  
 
Trade unions are traditionally associated with the standardisation of pay setting 
mechanisms, often in the form of seniority pay scales. Seniority can be considered a 
mechanism that unions adopt in order to enforce non-arbitrary procedures for pay 
and promotion and so any pay differentials arising out of seniority based systems are 
compatible with union goals. Freeman and Medoff (1984) underline the importance 
of seniority in the operation of a unionised workplace. According to the authors, 
“union seniority clauses protect older union workers from the danger of layoffs and 
give them greater chances of promotion compared with otherwise similar older 
nonunion workers” (pp. 135). A theory that provides an insight into how seniority 
is directly linked to wages in a union firm is the ‘discriminating monopoly’ 
approach that describes a non-uniform pricing model of union wages (Frank 1985; 
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Kuhn 1988; Kuhn and Robert 1989; Frank and Malcomson 1994). This model is 
similar to the multi-part tariff in product markets, where a product market 
monopolist is able to discriminate among consumers by applying a non-uniform 
price schedule that yields higher profits than otherwise. The discriminating 
monopoly theory implies that a seniority wage scale, usually accompanied by a ‘last-
in, first-out’ (LIFO) layoff rule, is adopted in the workplace.  
 
Under this framework, workers are positioned according to their job tenure in a 
queue, a seniority rank, based on which they are hired and laid off. Therefore, the 
firm is bound to first employ the senior workers offering them a higher wage rate, 
before it can employ junior workers at their reservation wage. From the unions’ 
point of view, irrespectively to what their preferences might be, concerning the 
distribution of rents among its members, a seniority wage scale can achieve greater 
employment efficiency and consequently more rents extracted from the firm (Kuhn 
1988, Kuhn and Robert 1989). Firms, on the other hand, are likely to adopt such a 
policy for a variety of reasons. Based on a seniority wage scale policy, as outlined 
above, the marginal employment decision from the employers’ perspective involves 
the low-wage junior workers who are employed only if their lifetime marginal 
product exceeds their lifetime income stream, both discounted at present value. 
Hence, as Booth and Frank (1996) claim, it is more profitable for the firm to hire at 
the bottom of a steep scale than the average wage on the scale would suggest. 
Furthermore, hiring costs are likely to exist and workers already employed may also 
have acquired firm-specific skills, i.e. outsiders are not perfect substitutes for 
insiders. Firms will attempt to discourage labour turnover among their most highly 
valued workers by implementing a seniority wage rule that under these 
circumstances appears to be an optimal policy. The adoption by firms of policies 
linking wages and tenure, of course, goes back to the 1970’s, as it is a central 
element of the descriptive theory of internal labour markets (ILMs). 
 
The concept of the ILM began with the seminal work of Doeringer and Piore 
(1971), who define the institution as “an administrative unit within which the 
pricing and allocation of labour is governed by a set of rules and procedures” (pp. 
1). The reasons for the existence of such institutions lie in the characteristics of joint 
production and the problems of monitoring and consistent incentives. ILMs develop 
to deal with these problems in the face of specificity in human capital investments, 
and opportunistic behaviour in the context of information asymmetries. 
   5
The primary rationale for ILMs is usually supposed to be specific investment 
(Wachter and Wright, 1990). Skill specificity is measured by the skill’s uniqueness 
to the job classification and the enterprise and is accumulated through on-the-job 
training. This kind of training occurs by ‘osmosis’ in the production process 
(Doeringer and Piore, 1971), where the participants assume dual duties of learning 
and carrying out the tasks and “is confined to those skills required for the job and 
no excess training” (pp. 27). However, for the worker, increasing skill specificity 
“reduces the incentive for him to invest in such training, while simultaneously 
increasing the incentive for the employer to make the investment” (pp. 14), since 
the skills cannot be readily utilised elsewhere.  
 
The four distinguishing features of ILMs, as summarised by Doeringer and Piore, 
are: 
1.  Entry to internal labour markets is via certain jobs and ports of entry. 
2.  Rules regarding job security, career arrangements and so on differentiate the 
insiders from the outsiders to the firms. 
3.  Employees are paid according to administrative rules and customs, so in a 
way wages are tied to jobs rather than to individuals. And,  
4.  Wages are influenced only weakly by conditions in the labor market external 
to the firm. 
 
A cornerstone of the Doeringer and Piore characterisation of ILMs is the notion that 
wages are attached to jobs and to a lesser extent to individuals and their human 
capital. Thereby the firm commits itself to a reward structure, which relies on 
promotions. Access to higher level positions on internal promotion ladders is not 
open to all comers on an unrestricted basis. As part of the internal incentive system, 
higher level positions are filled by promotion from within whenever this is feasible. 
This practice, especially if it is adopted by other enterprises to which the worker 
might otherwise turn for upgrading opportunities, ties the interests of the worker to 
the firm in a continuing way. Given these ties the worker looks to internal 
promotion as the principal means of improving his position. Reliance on internal 
promotion has affirmative incentive properties in that workers can anticipate that 
differential talent and degree of cooperativeness will be rewarded. Consequently, 
although the attachment of wages to jobs rather than to individuals may result in an 
imperfect correspondence between wages and marginal productivity at parts of 
entry, productivity differentials will be recognised over time and a more perfect 
correspondence can be expected for higher level assignments in the internal labour   6
market job hierarchy. Thus internal promotion ladders encourage a positive worker 
attitude towards on-the-job training and enable the firm to reward cooperative 
behaviour. 
 
ILMs, therefore, consist of sets of careers and relatively detailed defined career paths 
that in turn lead to long-term attachments. Adopting an ILM strategy may raise 
firm’s performance because career opportunities provide incentives to put forth 
more effort via promotion tournaments (Lazear and Rosen, 1981), delayed 
compensation (Lazear, 1981) or efficiency wages (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984) and 
to acquire firm-specific skills (Gibbons, 1997). Also, employers learn about their 
employees, which is useful in assigning workers to jobs and reduces firms’ hiring 
and screening costs. An additional reason for the existence of ILMs is that they can 
provide valuable insurance and stability to employees (Bertrand, 1999). ILM 
agreements are commonly reached through collective bargaining. Unionisation 
commonly facilitates grievance procedures and contract revision and renewal that 
enable the adjustment of these agreements to the changing conditions and to 
unforeseeable contingencies in a relatively nonlitigious manner. 
 
The discussion so far has clearly outlined unions’ opposition to subjective pay 
mechanisms like the Performance-Related Pay (PRP) scheme and their preference 
over objective pay setting, the standardisation of wages and seniority policies. Trade 
unions, by enforcing such pay setting processes in the establishment, create a less 
competitive and quite secure environment for the covered workers. Individuals, 
especially those more ‘vulnerable’ like seniors and minorities or female workers, feel 
more protected behind the egalitarian union representatives against layoffs and 
unfair or discriminating treatment. The standardisation of pay and the wage 
compression in the organised sector suggest that workers’ true productivity and 
qualifications may not be appropriately acknowledged. In a Mincer wage equation 
model that would be interpreted into flatter returns to human capital compared to 
the non-union sector. The worker-friendly pay setting processes that unions 
advocate mean that workers are not rewarded according to their actual contribution 
and individual merit, but based on some objective rules. While this is beneficial for 
part of the workforce, individuals with high qualifications and competitive skills 
may feel restricted and unsatisfied in an environment like this. High-skilled workers 
who are willing to voice their concerns to management personally, or are able to 
find alternative employment relatively easily may not feel the need of 
representation. Therefore, while for some workers unionism may be regarded as a   7
‘protective shield’, for some others it is more of a constraint, a burden in their career 
development. Effectively this may lead to a kind of sorting between the unionised 
and non-unionised sector based on individuals’ need for protection and job security. 
Murphy  et al. (1991), in their examination of the union effect on earnings 
distribution, conclude that “one principal effect of the pursuit of standard rate 
policies by trade unions is the attraction of a more homogeneous workforce into 
union employment” (pp. 536).  
 
The aim of this study is to explore how trade unions influence individuals’ earnings 
profiles. In particular, we want to examine how unionism interacts with the human 
capital wage premia, when considered in a Mincer earnings equation framework. 
From the discussion above, we form two hypotheses that we wish to investigate. 
First, in workplaces with union representation, the returns to employer-tenure 
should be higher than in the non-union sector. The main rationales behind this 
argument are two. Employer-tenure measures the years an individual spent working 
for a particular employer, i.e. it is the seniority of an individual in a particular job. 
Since organised sectors are more likely to adopt seniority rules as their pay setting 
process, instead of PRP schemes, we expect that seniority earnings profiles will be 
steeper than in workplaces with no workers’ associations. Furthermore, as Booth at 
al. (2001) suggest, relative to non-union workers, union-covered workers are more 
likely to receive training and they also receive more days of training than their non-
unionised counterparts2. In addition, they experience higher wage growth and a 
greater return to training. We can anticipate then that workers in the unionised 
sector are more likely to accumulate firm-specific skills, through training. 
Therefore, the returns to employer-tenure, as a proxy for job-specific skills, will be 
higher for the covered workers.  
 
The second proposition is that the returns to more transferable type of skills, 
acquired in work and appreciated by a number of employers, are steeper in the less 
restrictive and more competitive non-union sector. Contrary to the traditional 
opposition of unions to any pay setting mechanism based on individual merit, 
managers at workplaces with no union representation are more friendly and 
supportive to PRP schemes. Concequently, in non-unionised establishments, workers 
                                                 
2 A number of other studies on British data have found a positive correlation between work-related 
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are more likely to be rewarded based on their actual skills and productivity. Hence, 
true qualifications and competitive skills should be more important in these jobs 
than in unionised workplaces. 
 
Booth and Frank (1996) in a recent study on British data propose that union wage 
differential increase with seniority but only when formal seniority scales exist3. In 
the same spirit, Theodossiou (1996) argues that tenure has a significant positive 
effect on earnings in jobs with promotion policies, although he does not make any 
distinction between unionised and non-unionised firms. Nevertheless, this finding is 
in support of our first proportion since, as the analysis outlined before, the 
standardisation of pay setting procedures and promotion policies are strongly 
guarded by unions’ ‘sword of justice’. In this paper, there are many similarities with 
the study of Booth and Frank (1996), however the innovation of this work is that it 
provides a more detailed and complete map of the acquired human capital that has 
some rather interesting implications concerning the individuals’ earnings profiles. 
While the previous studies divide accumulated human capital into firm-specific and 
general labour market, Zangelidis (2002) argues that acquired skills in work should 
be further decomposed. According to the author, the existing literature overlooks 
the importance of occupation-specific skills in the wage determination process.  
 
Here we adopt this approach and alongside job-tenure and labour market 
experience we include occupational and industry experience in our analysis. Job-
tenure is usually considered in the literature as a measure of seniority and, under 
the assumption that workers accumulate firm-specific human capital, as a proxy of 
non-transferable (between jobs) skills. On the other hand, we can think of 
occupational experience as a measure of the individual’s expertise in a particular 
occupation, i.e. of the individual’s occupation-specific skills that are transferable 
between different firms/employers within the same job description (occupation). It 
is of great interest to explore how trade unions and/or formal wage policies in a 
workplace affect the individuals’ earnings profiles when examined at the different 
levels of transferability of the accumulated skills. According to Booth and Frank 
(1996) seniority wage scale policies are more likely to be adopted in workplaces 
where strong trade unions are present and individual productivity is hard to 
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measure. If we imagine such a workplace we would probably expect job tenure, 
rather than true productivity, to play an important role on earnings. On the 
contrary, in a more competitive environment, not so restricted by formal wage 
policies, one might expect that the individual’s expertise on the job he performs and 
consequently his productivity would be more appreciated and rewarded. In this 
paper we address these questions and explore how workplace features, like 
unionism and seniority scales, influence the importance of job-tenure and 
accumulated skills in the wage determination process.  
 
In  Section 2 we provide a brief description of the data set employed for the 
empirical analysis. Then, in Section 3, we examine the interaction between union 
representation in the workplace and individuals’ earnings profiles. We begin our 
analysis with the estimation of standard union and non-union wage equations, 
Section 3.1, and in the second part, Section 3.2, we address the selectivity issue in 
the estimates, driven by the endogeneity of union status. In Section 4, we explore 
whether we can explain the observed distinct earnings paths in union and non-
union jobs with the existence of formal seniority wage policies in these workplaces. 
Finally in Section 5, we conclude the discussion with a summary of the most 
important findings.  
 
2 Data  Description 
 
The empirical analysis of this paper is based on the British Household Panel Survey 
(BHPS), covering the period between September 1991 and May 1999 (Waves 1-8). 
This is a nationally representative household panel survey of around 5,500 
households (containing about 10,000 persons) randomly selected South of the 
Caledonian Canal (thus excluding the North of Scotland and Northern Ireland). The 
first survey of the BHPS was conducted in the autumn of 1991, and annually 
thereafter. The sample used in our analysis is restricted to individuals who are 
Original Sample Members (OSM). These are mainly individuals within the 
randomly selected initial sample drawn from the Postcode Address File. All OSMs 
are followed throughout all future waves of the BHPS where possible. In addition, 
other respondents not initially included in the initial sample may be added to the 
group of OSMs when associated with an OSM in the formation of a new household4. 
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Continuing on the description of the sample used, the individuals considered are 
male individuals between 18 and 60 years of age, who reported working full-time 
(at least 30 hours per week) and are not self-employed. Individuals with missing 
information or imputed data in the variables used in the empirical analysis are 
excluded from this sample. The earnings variable mainly considered in the 
estimated wage equations is the natural logarithm of the nominal gross average 
hourly wage, defined as the usual weekly pay divided by the usual paid hours in a 
week, including overtime paid. For the construction of the hourly wage, usual paid 
hours and overtime paid hours in a week are normalised to equal a maximum of 60 
hours for the former and 12 hours for the latter. Therefore, an upper bound is 
imposed on the reported hours of work in order to avoid potential biases from 
measurement errors in the estimates of interest. The reason we use hourly wage 
rates instead of weakly or monthly rates is mainly because there may be different 
patterns that govern the employment conditions and labour supply preferences of 
employees. Since not all individuals work the same number of hours, their weekly 
or monthly wages are bound to differ. Using hourly wage rates though, allow us 
some degree of uniformity across the whole sample, as we incorporate any 
dispersion in the hours of work.  
 
The BHPS provides valuable information on the employment history of the 
respondents, which is very useful for the construction of some human capital 
variables. At each wave their current labour market status is reported, as well as 
their employment history for the period beginning on 1st of September a year prior 
to the interview. In addition, information on the complete labour market history of 
the individuals, since leaving full-time education for the first time, is recorded in the 
second wave and, complete job data are also collected at the third wave (1993). 
Based on these records, we are able to follow the sample of individuals since the 
beginning of their labour market history and construct their total actual labour 
market experience (full-time), current employer-tenure, occupational and industry-
specific experience.  
 
The empirical examination is based on an unbalanced panel sample. This 
unbalanced panel sample is a sample of employees who appear at least twice, thus 
the maximum panel length of any sample member is eight years, while the 
minimum panel length is two years. Some of the main characteristics of this sample 
are provided in Table 1, where averages on employer-tenure, general total labour   11
market experience, industry and occupational experience are presented separately 
for the union and non-union sector. Although an analysis on simple descriptive 
statistics would probably be inadequate and certainly not exhaustive, the figures in 
the table are quite indicative of some distinct patterns that govern these two sectors. 
In particular, what is interesting here is the fact that in general the average duration 
of employment history, measured either as tenure or experience, is longer in the 
organized sector than in the non-union sector. A finding that probably reflects the 
higher job stability and security that former workplaces actually offer. The most 
characteristic example from the table is employees’ recorded tenure, where on 
average men in unionised jobs appear to stay with their current employer about two 
years more, compared with their peers in the non-union sector. 
 
3  Seniority Earnings Profile Under Unionism 
 
The purpose of this section is to examine the different wage growth paths in the 
union and non-union sector. Before we address though this question, we need to 
decide on the definition of union status. We can define union status either at the 
individual level as union membership, or at the workplace level as union coverage. 
The choice between the two is actually the answer to whether there is a free-rider 
problem associated with union membership or not. One of the main roles of trade 
unions is the improvement of wages and working conditions above the perfectly 
competitive level (the union’s monopoly role). Economists, Olson (1965) among the 
first, have argued that there is indeed a free-rider problem associated with union 
wage premium. The reason behind that is that in an establishment, where a union is 
recognised for pay bargaining, all workers regardless of their membership status 
can enjoy the improved wages and working conditions. Therefore, the above the 
perfectly competitive level wages and the better working conditions are normally a 
collective good since it is difficult to exclude workers who are not union members. 
Individuals acting as rational economic agents faced with a public good are 
expected to take a free ride on union membership and enjoy this collective good 
without incurring the monetary or physic costs of membership. Two recent studies 
(Booth and Bryan, 2001; Bryson, 2002) using the linked employer-employee data 
from the Workplace Employee Relations Survey 1998 (WERS) provide empirical 
evidence to the free-rider argument. The authors examine the membership   12
premium among covered workers and conclude that there was no union 
membership wage premium in the late 1990s for Britain’s private sector workers5.  
 
The question that naturally comes to mind is why then individuals still want to join 
a union or, why union members do not leave the union. Trade unions are also 
traditionally associated with the provision of friendly society benefits, grievance 
procedures and the like. These are normally excludable, private goods or services 
available only to union members that may act as an incentive to workers to unionise 
(Booth and Chaterji, 1995). In addition, workers may feel the need or pressure to 
comply with the group norm of union membership (Booth, 1985; Naylor, 1989) or 
they may join and remain members because they are ideologically committed to 
doing so. The theoretical rationale and empirical evidence, in conclusion, suggests 
that the union wage premium is a public good available to all covered workers 
regardless of membership status. Therefore, in our analysis here we define union 
status solely based on the existence of a recognised trade union in the workplace. 
This way we may optimally avoid the ‘free-rider’ effect in a union job, which applies 
to a considerable proportion of workers in United Kingdom.  
 
The discussion in this section focuses on the workers’ earnings profiles in the union 
and non-union sector. In the first part (Section 3.1), we present conventional wage 
equation estimates separately for a workplace with union representation and 
without. Then in the second part (Section 3.2), we concentrate on the issue of the 
endogeneity of union status, and re-estimate these earnings models, controlling for 
potential selectivity bias in the results. 
 
3.1  Unionism and Wage Equations 
 
We begin the analysis here by estimating standard Mincer earnings equations 
separately for the union and the non-union sectors:  
   01 uit u u uit uit WX β βε = ++     (1) 
  01 nit n n nit nit WX β βε = ++  (2) 
                                                 
5 Similarly, Barth et al. (2000) using a matched employer-employee data set for Norway find that 
individual membership status ceases to have any significant effect on the wage when establishment-
level union density is included and conclude that the union wage effect is a pure public good.   13
where  uit W  is the log union wage and  nit W  is the log nonunion wage for individual i 
at period t.  X is the vector of variables determining earnings and  's β  are the 
coefficients to be estimated. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the hourly 
wage rate, including overtime paid hours. The human capital variables on the right-
hand side of the equation include job-tenure (measured in decades), actual labour 
market experience, industry and occupational experience (measured in years)6. 
Alongside these variables, the remaining regressors consist of controls for individual 
characteristics such as education, skills, qualification and current occupation, 
workplace characteristics like establishment size and industry sector and regional 
dummies and a time trend. The results are summarised in Table 2, where the 
derived ten-year effect7 of tenure, labour market experience and industry and 
occupation experience is calculated and presented, in order to help the comparison 
between these two sectors. We acknowledge that the estimates of the effect of these 
four variables may be inconsistent due to unobserved heterogeneity across 
individuals and across matches. Although this potential endogeneity bias is not of 
major concern, We utilise the panel element of our data set and employ panel 
estimators8, generalised least square (GLS) and within-group fixed effects (FE)9, 
                                                 
6 Quadratic polynomial for labour market experience and cubic polynomials for the other three 
human capital variables. 
7 Through out the paper, we present the findings from the estimated earnings model, based on the 
calculated ten-year effect of the four human-capital variables of interest. 
8 A technical note concerning the estimation process, for identification unit in the panel estimates we 
use alternatively (I) the individual, and (II) the individual working for a specific employer, i.e. if an 
individual is observed working for different employers in the sample he is treated as a different 
unit/individual. The latter method may capture some unobserved job-match effects that the former 
might not, especially for the estimates on the returns to job-tenure. 
9 When fixed effect estimators are employed, an identification problem arises driven by the presence 
of both employer-tenure and actual labour market experience in the wage equation model. For those 
individuals who do not have any part-time employment spell, the increase between two consecutive 
waves in both tenure and labour market experience is the same. This implies that we cannot 
simultaneously estimate their effect when using fixed effects (difference from mean). The only case 
where they can be both estimated is for those individuals who had some part-time working 
experience between, for example, two consecutive waves. In that case the increase in labour market 
experience will be higher than the one in employer-tenure. Effectively though that means that the 
obtained coefficients of labour market experience do not measure its effect on wages, but rather 
capture this event in their employment history. Therefore, when fixed effect estimators are employed, 
in order to avoid this kind of identification problem we exclude the linear term of labour market 
experience from the estimated model. Consequently, in the case of fixed effects the returns to labour 
market experience are not presented in the tables.   14
alongside OLS estimator. Finally, on what it concerns the level of identification of 
the industry and occupation sector for the measurement of the individual’s 
accumulated experience in them, we use alternatively both the 1-digit and 2-digit 
level of classification.  
 
The results presented in Table 2 provide a rather interesting insight on the 
differences in the earnings profiles between the union and non-union sector. If we 
compare the first half of the table (union) with the second half (non-union) we can 
derive some distinct paths between the two sectors. Job tenure, while it appears to 
have a modest but positive and significant contribution in those establishments 
where workers are organised into trade unions, the same is not true for their peers 
in the non-union sector. Furthermore, in the union sector labour market experience 
and occupational experience are estimated to have a significant positive effect on 
individuals’ earnings. However the impact is stronger in the less restricted non-
unionised workplaces. This is especially true for occupational experience, where the 
calculated contribution (ten-year effect) is at least double the size compared to the 
union sector. Finally, wages, in the second half of the table, appear to increase with 
industry experience, particularly when the latter is measured at the 2-digit level of 
classification. According to these findings, seniority and/or firm-specific skills are 
important only in workplaces with trade unions present. In work environments 
though less protective and restricted, it is the more competitive and transferable 
kind of human capital that really matters in the wage determination.  
 
This first attempt to explore the earnings profiles in the covered and non-covered 
sector sheds some light. From the wage equation models on the male employees we 
can conclude that seniority is closely related to wages in workplaces where trade 
unions exist. In these protected working environments where formal policies 
probably exist concerning the employment and the level of wages, senior workers 
are more valued compared with their junior colleagues. However, individuals with 
competitive and transferable skills, such as occupation-specific skills, are far better 
of in jobs less restricted where their true productivity is more likely to be 
acknowledged.  
 
One main source of concern with the above findings is the endogeneity of union 
status. Individuals are not randomly assigned in the union or non-union sector. On 
the contrary, the distribution of workers among these two sectors is governed by 
rational decisions and behaviours of both the employees and the employers.   15
Workers select themselves into their most preferred sector, while employers choose 
from the pool of available workers those individuals that they desire. An obvious 
issue that arise from this discussion is the potential sample selection bias in the 
previous estimates. The two samples, in the union and non-union sector, may be 
characterised by different features concerning both the individuals and the 
workplace. In other words, the estimated differences in the wage equation models 
between the two sectors may after all be the result of the likely heterogeneity of the 
two samples, rather than genuine distinct patterns in the earnings profiles. We 
explore this route in the following section and address the selectivity issue in the 
wage equation framework.  
 
3.2  Endogeneity of Union Status 
 
It is generally agreed that union status should be treated as an endogenous variable 
(Dungan and Leigh 1985). The fact that, for example, we observe an individual in 
the union sector is the result of distinct systematically made decisions from the two 
parties involved (employees and employers), where they both aim to maximise their 
utility. A theoretical model, mainly developed in the US literature, that describes this 
whole process is the ‘queuing model’ based on the influential and pioneer work of 
Abowd and Farber (1982) that basically involves a dual selection process. Workers, 
based on the utilities that each sector yields to them, make explicit decisions 
regarding their desire for union representation in their workplace. However, the 
preference towards the union sector does not necessarily result into employment on 
a union job, since it is the employer who decides whom to employ from the 
available queue of workers, in order to produce at minimum cost. Hence, “a 
worker’s union status is determined by both a desire for a union job and the 
employer’s selection criteria” (pp. 355). In other words, the observable event of 
union status requires the queuing process from the employee’s side and her being 
selected by the employer.  
 
Although such a theoretical model may be quite insightful on the behaviours that 
govern the observable event of union status, it is still questionable whether it is 
applicable to the British labour market or not. Furthermore, since the only event the 
researcher observes is the union status is quite difficult to distinguish these two steps 
(queuing and selection) and discern whether non-union workers did not actually 
desire to work in a union job, or were just not chosen from the queue, although they   16
wanted union representation. In practice that means that unless we can find at least 
one variable that is contained in one model (e.g. queuing) but not in the other (e.g. 
selection) we are unable to distinguish these two processes and identify the possible 
different behaviour patterns that characterise them. Therefore, due to the 
ambiguous validity of the model for the case of Britain and to limitations in our data 
set, we do not pursuit this route. Instead we estimate a probit model on the event of 
union status that although it does not provide us with any insight on both employees 
and the employers’ decisions, it still serves well its purpose concerning the control 
of selectivity bias.  
 
Specifically, we estimate the structural form of the union status model, specified as: 
 
*
0 ij it it Union Z α αε = ++  (3) 
and 
 
* 1 if  0 and =0 otherwise it it Union Union =>   
where 
*
it Union  is the latent variable indicating union representation in the 
workplace,  it Union  is the observed union status,  it Z  is a vector of personal and job 
characteristics and  ()
2 0, it ε σ ∼ . 
 
The regressors  it Z  included in the union probit model are those used in the earnings 
equation model presented above. However, for identification purposes we require at 
least one more variable that affects the event of working in a job with union 
representation that has no obvious impact on wages. The author suggests that 
individuals’ political beliefs may influence ones decision of whether or not to work 
in an unionised environment but they do not have any effect on their earnings 
profile. We can think of ideology as a proxy of what the views and perceptions of an 
individual are concerning various aspects of everyday life, including trade unions 
and collective bargaining in the workplace. Under this assumption, we would 
expect people located in the center and left at the ‘political map’ to be friendlier 
towards the idea of unionism and collective action10. Figure 1 gives us a vague idea 
on how individuals, according to the party they support, are distributed between the 
                                                 
10 Arabsheibani and Marin (2001) use similar identifying variables for the construction of a 
structural union-membership equation in a selectivity-corrected union wage gap model for UK. 
Commenting on the validity of their choice, the authors argue that “in the U.K. trade unions have 
always been closely associated with the Labour Party in particular, and with more left wing policies 
in general” (pp. 2).   17
union and non-union sector. Although one might argue that this is a rather 
traditional view, questioning its validity in nowadays, the empirical findings 
presented below support our initial assumption. Hence, alongside the regressors 
from the wage equation model we include three dummy variables corresponding to 
whether the individual feels closer to the Conservative party, Labour party or the 
Liberal Democrats11. BHPS contains a series of questions on respondents’ political 
views. In particular, individuals are asked if they support a particular political 
party, and if so which party they regard themselves as being closer to than the 
others. The replies to these two questions form the basis for the construction of the 
political beliefs dummy variables that we use below. 
 
Table 3 presents the derived marginal effects from the estimated union status probit 
model. The model is estimated both at 1-digit and 2-digit of industry and 
occupational classification, however the results remain fairly similar irrespectively 
to the chosen level of identification. Before we move on to the findings, it should be 
stretched out that the interpretation of the results is not a straightforward one. The 
difficulty arises from the fact that the actual process of joining a union job is 
unobserved to the researcher. Therefore, we reckon that it would probably be more 
appropriate to interpret the findings as the effect that individual and job 
characteristics have on the probability that one is observed in a unionised 
workplace, rather than attempt to suggest behavioural strategies from the employers 
and employees. Starting with the findings, in general the signs on the significant 
variables in the union status equation are what would be expected a priori.  
 
The polynomial terms of job tenure appear to be significant, suggesting a positive 
relationship between seniority and union status. One possible interpretation of this 
finding is that the individuals who plan to stay for many years in a job and 
accumulate tenure are more likely to be observed in a workplace with union 
representation. Apparently, the security that trade unions offer provides an 
incentive to those individuals who seek stability in their careers. On what it 
concerns the political beliefs, the individual used as the base for the estimates is he 
                                                 
11 The methodology employed here relies on the conventional assumption that individuals’ political 
views and party attachment are rather stable in the long term (Green and Palmquist, 1990). 
Therefore, while short-term factors (e.g. economic conditions) may influence voters, such shifts are 
transitory, as individuals are expected rather soon to return to their preferred party. Within this 
framework, political beliefs are formed at an early life stage based on parents’ given preferences, 
socio-economic status, race, religion and region and remain fairly stable over the years.   18
who supports a party different from the three most popular mentioned above or, no 
party at all12. According to the findings, the workers who support the Labour party 
are those most likely to be observed in an unionised environment, followed by the 
Liberal Democrat supporters. Those located to the right in the political spectrum are 
less likely to work in the unionised sector, compared to the supporters of the other 
two major parties. Furthermore, the results suggest some strong regional effects 
especially for the North and the Wales, where the probability that an individual is 
employed in a union job are higher compared to the reference region of the South. 
In addition, the model captures some industry and occupation13 effects on the 
probability of union status suggesting that some sectors are more likely to have 
union representation than others, or simply that workers in particular sectors prefer 
more to work in a unionised place. More specifically, individuals in Agriculture, 
Energy and Manufacture of Metals, Mineral Products and Chemicals sector as well 
as Other Services are more likely to work in an unionised environment. While those 
in Metal Goods and Engineering industries and in Hotels and Catering sector are the 
least likely to be represented by a trade union. Moreover, those with Managerial and 
Professional occupations have lower probability of being observed in an unionised 
workplace compared with employees in other occupations. According to the 
estimates, the occurrence of union status is more likely in larger workplaces, which 
is something that we should expect since union representation in general is more 
likely to be observed in workplaces with a large number of employees. Two last 
remarks on the findings, semi and high skilled workers, as well as non-manual 
workers are those that are most likely to be working in a union job. And finally, the 
probability of union status reduces as the years pass. Whether though this occurs 
because unionism overall declines through the years or simply because of some 
unobserved time trend captured in the data is not clear.  
 
Before we continue to our analysis, there is another issue that worthies also 
addressing here. The estimates on the union-status probit model in Table 3 suggest a 
positive relationship between union-status and job seniority. One interpretation that 
we suggest above is that individuals who prefer stability to possibly frequent job 
changes are more likely to find employment in an unionised environment. However, 
there may be an alternative explanation to this estimated effect. Employer-tenure 
                                                 
12 The base group, those who support a party other than the three main ones or does not support any, 
is approximately one quarter of the whole sample. 
13 A complete list of the industry and occupational dummies considered is provided in the Appendix.   19
may be endogenously determined by some unobserved individual and workplace 
characteristics that may also influence whether an individual is employed in a 
unionised sector or not. Similarly to a wage equation model, the estimated positive 
effect of tenure may actually be driven by the correlation with individual and 
workplace characteristics not observed to the researcher. Here we attempt to clarify 
this issue and take a closer look on the potential endogeneity of the obtained job-
tenure effect.  
 
A test of endogeneity always requires the specification of a list of instruments for the 
variables under suspicion. For that purpose of our analysis we employ the 
instrumental variables suggested by Altonji and Shakotko (1987) (AS thereafter), 
where employer-tenure is instrumented by the deviation from its job-match mean 
for every individual. On the basis of this instrument we compute a test of exogeneity 
for the union-status probit model as proposed by Smith and Blundel (1986). This 
test is related to the Davidson-MacKinnon auxiliary regression test for exogeneity in 
a regression context (an alternative to the commonly used Hausman test). This test 
involves a two-step estimation process. In the first stage, the variables suspected for 
endogeneity are expressed as a linear projection of a set of instruments, those 
specified by the researcher plus all other explanatory variables of the probit model. 
The residuals from each first stage instrument regression are then included in the 
probit model. A test on the joint significance of the coefficients on the residual series 
is performed. Under the null hypothesis, the probit model is appropriately specified 
with all suspected variables as exogenous, i.e. the residuals from the auxiliary 
regressions should have no explanatory power. A rejection of the null hypothesis 
indicates that the standard probit estimator should not be employed. The performed 
Smith-Blundel test of exogeneity, based on the AS instrumented variables for tenure, 
rejects the null hypothesis with a Chi-square (X2(3)) of 10.936 (Chi-square: 11.809, 
when industry and occupational experience are measured at a 2-digit level). 
Employer-tenure appears to be endogenously determined in the union-status probit 
model. After all, the unobserved individual and workplace characteristics that affect 
the presence of an individual in an unionised workplace appear to influence also 
the duration of his employment spell in that job. 
 
As an alternative model to the union-status probit model in Table 3, we can employ 
the instrumental variable probit model using Amemiya Generalised Least Squares   20
(AGLS)14 that is used for estimating probit models where some of the independent 
variables are endogenous (in our case the employer-tenure polynomial). The 
estimates from this IV-Probit model on union-status (not included here) reduce the 
estimated effect of tenure both in magnitude and in statistical significance. Seniority 
does not appear to have an explanatory role anymore in the event of been employed 
in a union-sector. The findings from the IV-Probit on the rest of the regressors 
remain fairly similar to those provided in Table 3. Apparently, what this analysis 
implies is that the previously estimated positive relationship between union-status 
and job-tenure may actually have to do with the fact that tenure is endogenously 
determined in this probit model15. Nevertheless, for the estimation purposes of 
Heckman’s selection model on the earnings equations we employ the probit model 
presented in Table 3. 
 
Moving now in our analysis, if union status is endogenous in a wage equation 
framework, then: 
 
** ( | 0) 0 and  ( | 0) 0 uit it nit it E Union E Union εε >≠ ≤≠  
This means that OLS estimated coefficients of the wage Equations (1) and (2) are 
inconsistent. In Table 4 we present the estimated earnings equations, where we 
control for selectivity, based on the union status probit models discussed above. The 
Heckman maximum-likelihood estimates overall deliver rather similar estimates to 
those summarised in Table 2, where we do not control for potential sample selection 
bias. According to the results, job tenure has a positive and significant effect only in 
the union sector. Apparently, seniority is an important determinant of individuals’ 
earnings profiles in a workplace with union representation16. A finding that verifies 
                                                 
14 Maddala (1983) provides a good summary of how AGLS works and Newey (1987, eq. 5.6) the 
specific formulas used for the estimation. 
15 We should acknowledge though that our discussion here relies on the specific instruments used 
and consequently on how appropriate and valid they are for the sample. 
16 The selectivity-corrected model presented here does not consider the fact that employer-tenure 
may be endogenously determined in the union-status probit model. This may cast some doubt on the 
reliability of the estimated tenure effect in the former model. However, a performed Hausman test on 
the exogeneity of tenure in a wage equation model (as the one presented in Table 2) on the whole 
sample of male employees and separately on the union and non-union sub-samples, based on the AS 
instruments, is in favour of the OLS estimator (estimates not included here). Therefore, although the 
duration of the current employment appears to be simultaneously determined with the union-status, 
it behaves as an exogenous explanatory variable in the wage determination process, both in the 
union and non-union sector. This finding may reinforce our confidence on the derived estimates on 
seniority.    21
our discussion above on the role of trade unions on the remuneration policies 
adopted by the management and their positive attitude towards the standardization 
of wages and seniority policies. On the other hand, total labour market experience 
appears to have a contribution of similar magnitude on both sectors. Occupational 
experience, although, is appreciated and rewarded in both sectors, the magnitude of 
its effect on wages differs between them, with the non-union sector being more 
appreciative to it. The derived returns to ten years of occupational expertise in the, 
more competitive and less structured, non-union sector are more than triple in size 
compared to the well protected working environment of a union job. Finally, the 
results suggest that selectivity is significant only in the non-union sector. The 
positive sign of rho at the bottom of the table for the non-union sector simply 
indicates that the factors, which have a positive effect on the individual’s earnings in 
the non-union sector also, raise the probability of being observed in this sector.  
 
The discussion presented here sheds some light to the different earnings paths 
followed in the union and non-union sector. The results strongly suggest that 
seniority plays an important role in the earnings profiles of those working in a 
workplace with union representation. On the contrary, in the more competitive and 
meritocratic environment of a non-union job, individuals appear to be rewarded for 
their true productivity and expertise. In the next section, we explore whether this 
phenomenon has to do merely with the presence of a trade union or with the 
existence of formal wage scale policies in that sector and what happens if no such 
policies are adopted in the union sector. 
 
4  Pay-Rise Policies and Human Capital Wage Premia 
 
Our findings in Section 3 imply the presence of distinct seniority-wages profiles 
between the union and non-union sector. Here, we attempt to provide a better 
understanding of the underlining mechanism in the unionised workplaces that 
drives these strong seniority-earnings ties. Trade unions are traditionally associated 
with the standardisation of pay-setting procedures and the adaptation of seniority 
rules in the workplace. In the previous section we examine whether union wage 
differentials increase with seniority without though making any distinction about 
the presence of pay-rise rules. The observed steeper seniority profiles may 
universally be true for the whole covered sector, as the findings above suggest or, 
they may actually be driven by formal objective rules related to pay-setting that   22
unions through bargaining enforce in the workplace. If the latter is true, then what 
happens in those establishments with union representation but no formal seniority 
policies? Are senior workers less protected in this case? These are the issues that we 
address in this section and attempt to shed some light on. 
 
There are two candidate questions from BHPS that can help us identify workplaces 
where formal wage policies are adopted. Individuals are asked whether seniority 
wage scales exist in the current job17. In addition, there is another question, more 
general though, on the promotion opportunities in their current job18. The author is 
in favour of the former because it appears to be more directly linked to wages than 
the latter, which is broader in the sense that it may refer to aspects of work not 
related to earnings such as the job description, responsibilities and work conditions. 
From the 2834 male workers who reported that they have opportunities for 
promotion, only 1485 were expecting a pay-rise next year. Therefore, we base our 
analysis on the information that individuals provide in BHPS concerning the 
existence of formal wage scale policies.  
 
At the first part of this section, we present estimates on wage equations, similar to 
the ones in the previous section19, where we divide and examine separately the 
workers depending on the existence of incremental wage scale policies in their 
current job. Table 5 summarises the estimated effects in jobs with pay-rise and no 
pay-rise. Employer-tenure does not appear to have an important role here in these 
estimates. The only case where we derive a significant and positive effect is when 
pay-rise policies are adopted, based on the OLS estimator. Total labour market 
experience has a strong positive effect on both cases, workplaces with or without 
seniority policies, but its effect is marginally stronger in the latter case. Furthermore, 
industry experience appears to have a significant and positive contribution only 
when measured at the more detailed 2-digit level of industry classification and in 
workplaces with pay-rise rules. The evidence also suggests that the more 
competitive and transferable occupation-specific skills are highly rewarded in the 
less restricted and more flexible workplaces where no formal seniority-wage scales 
                                                 
17 The question addressed is: “Some people can normally expect their pay to rise every year by 
moving to the next point on the scale, as well as receiving negotiated pay rises. Are you paid on this 
type of incremental scale?”. 
18 “In your current job do you have opportunities for promotion?”. 
19 The sample size marginally reduces for the employees, due to missing information on the existence 
of wage scales in their current job.   23
exist. The findings overall imply that there are obvious similarities between the 
earnings profiles in a union job and in a job with seniority-wage scales. We 
continue our analysis towards that direction and we first explore which are the 
individual and job characteristics that determine the existence of scale coverage in a 
workplace.  
 
The probit estimates of the determinants of scales coverage are given in Table 6. The 
two main findings that stand out are the strong union effect and the role of firm size 
in the adoption of wage scale policies. Workplaces with trade unions present are 
more likely to have seniority wage scale rules. According to the estimated marginal 
effect of union job, union representation increases the probability of adopting a 
seniority-wage rule by 20 per cent, a rather significant effect. The ‘discriminating 
monopoly’ view, discussed above, provides the theoretical reasoning why trade 
unions may relate wages to seniority through formal scales. It worthies noting that 
in these estimated models we consider only the presence of a trade union in the 
workplace and not the individual membership. In an alternative specification 
(results not presented here) we include union membership in the regressors vector. 
The interesting result that comes out of this model is that whether an individual is a 
member of a trade union or not does not appear to have any notable effect on the 
probability of getting a pay-rise next year. What this finding really implies is that 
adopted seniority-earnings policies, probably as the outcome of a bargaining 
process between the management and union representatives, apply to all covered 
workers in the establishment, regardless of their membership status. More 
explicitly, wage incremental policies are public goods, not excludable to workers 
who did not join the trade union. Antithetically, when we estimate a similar probit 
model on the probability of getting a promotion the following year (the other 
candidate variable, available in BHPS) we find that union membership increases 
significantly the chances of being promoted (estimates excluded from the analysis). 
The estimated positive and significant effect of union membership in the latter 
model clearly suggests that promotions when negotiated by a trade union are more 
of a private good, available mainly to union members. This is a quite interesting 
finding which in a way provides further support and reasoning to our initial choice 
of pay-rise policies instead of promotions as proxies of pecuniary future prospects of 
individuals’ current employment. As mentioned earlier in the paper, recent studies 
provide evidence of the ‘free-rider’ phenomenon in unionised workplaces. 
Therefore since the improvement of wages is normally a collective good available to 
all workers in the union sector, we would expect that individuals could benefit from   24
policies related to their wages without necessarily having to join a trade union. And, 
that is exactly what we find from these estimated probit models.  
 
Continuing now to the remaining of Table 6, we observe that as the size of the 
workplace increases, so does the probability of implementing a formal wage policy. 
This is something that one should expect, since seniority wage scale is likely to 
emerge as an alternative to individual performance related or merit pay in work-
environments where productivity and output are difficult to monitor. This is 
especially true for firms with many employees, where due to the large scales of 
production it is inherently hard to measure productivity. Individuals who are 
already employed in a job, which requires substantial total labour market 
experience or industry experience, have a higher probability of operating under a 
pay-rise policy, compared with other colleagues. Occupational expertise, on the 
other hand, has a positive effect on wage scale rules, especially at the early stages of 
skills-accumulation (this is true only at the 1-digit level of occupation classification 
though). Finally, workers in Agriculture,  Energy and Manufacture of Metals, 
Mineral Products and Chemicals and Other Services industries are significantly 
more likely to be covered by wage scales.  
 
Following Booth and Frank’s (1996) analysis we re-estimate the pay-rise probit 
model, this time making a distinction between the union and non-union sector 
(estimates not included in the paper). While Booth and Frank suggest that, in non-
union jobs, scales do not affect earnings and the variables in their data set do not 
explain the existence of wage scales, our findings between the two sectors have 
some similarities. Many of the individual and job characteristics that play a 
significant role in union jobs appear to do so also in workplaces with no trade 
unions present. Therefore we cannot really distinguish any different pattern towards 
the implementation of wage policies in these two sectors.  
 
Two main conclusions are drawn from the analysis so far. Seniority earnings 
profiles are quite distinct between jobs with wage scales policies and those with no 
such formal earnings rules. In addition, unionism has a strong positive effect on the 
probability of adopting a scale rule in the workplace. In the final part of this section, 
we investigate the earnings equations in the union and non-union sector, where we 
control for the existence of formal wage policies in these environments. The 
question we aim to answer here is whether the formal seniority policies, which are 
more likely to be adopted in an unionised workplace, are the reason behind the   25
steeper seniority-earnings profiles we observe in the union sector. An issue of 
concern that arises from the estimates presented in Table 5, as well as from the 
estimates presented below is the selectivity issue. The findings from the probit 
models on the existence of wage scales outlined the importance of various 
individual and workplace features on the adoption of such policies. The problem 
that the researcher faces in these cases is the selection of the appropriate controls 
that could serve for the identification of the selectivity variables in the earnings 
equations. In other words, we need to find some variables that influence the 
occurrence of a wage scale policy, but are not expected to have any direct impact on 
the wage determination process. Theodossiou (1996) suggests various controls on 
employees’ social background and the employers’ or employees’ attitudes and 
characteristics, which can be included in the probit equation for the identification 
purpose. We explored this path, by examining various variables that optimally 
could serve this identification purpose, such as training provided by the employers 
and the presence of a second job. However, data limitations prevent us from finding 
such appropriate controls. Therefore, in the estimated earnings models presented 
below we do not correct for potential selectivity bias. Another possible source of 
sample selection is the fact that individuals are not randomly assigned in union or 
non-union jobs. Following the analysis presented in Section 3.2, we similarly control 
for this union-driven sample selection bias in the discussion below.  
 
Optimally, this selectivity correction may capture some of the possible former 
selection bias, since union jobs are more likely to implement a formal wage scale 
policy. In a way, when we identify the union selectivity variables in the estimated 
wage equation model, we may be incidentally doing so for the wage policy 
selectivity as well. The reason is that, as the union and wage scale probit models 
suggest, the individual and workplace characteristics that determine whether we 
observe a worker in a union job or not, are broadly the same that influence the 
allocation of the individual in a job with seniority scales or not. In what follows, we 
estimate a wage equation model on four sub-samples depending on whether there is 
union representation and formal wage scale policies in the workplace. We 
acknowledge the fact that we cannot ‘entirely’ control the pay-rise selectivity issue 
and probably we should bear that in mind when investigating the findings 
presented below. However, when we make comparisons within the unionised sector 
between workplaces with and without formal seniority-wage rules, the selectivity 
issue probably is not very important. Our intuition is that the individual 
characteristics and workplace features that determine the adoption of such rules in   26
an establishment are likely to be present in both union sub-samples. After all, 
unionism, and consequently the determinants of union representation in a 
workplace, is one of the main explanatory variables in the estimated pay-rise probit 
model. The pay-rise selectivity issue may be more serious when we make 
comparisons between the union and non-union sector, where their main sample 
characteristics are likely to differ. If we control though for union-status sample 
selection we control for the differences in the two sub-samples (union and non-
union). The differences that are also likely to influence the adoption of a formal 
wage rule in a workplace. Hence even in the case where we make comparisons 
between the two sectors it is not clear to the author how ‘corruptive’ this potential 
pay-rise sample selection may eventually be. 
 
Table 7 summarises the main findings from the estimated earnings models. The first 
half of the table corresponds to jobs with pay-rise policies and the other half to jobs 
with no such formal policy. Similarly, the first two columns refer to union jobs (1-
digit and 2-digit of industry and occupation classification, respectively) while the 
other two to non-union ones. We present the derived ten-year effect of these four 
seniority and human capital variables of interest (with the standard errors in 
parentheses). The findings reveal some rather interesting patterns in the individuals’ 
wage profiles. Employer-tenure is estimated to have a positive and significant effect 
of around 6 per cent (ten-year effect) on wages only for employees in workplaces 
with union representation and formal pay-rise policies (the most restricted 
workplace of all possible four). Antithetically, occupational expertise is appreciated 
only in the non-union sector, especially when no seniority rules are adopted (the 
least structured working environment). In addition, total labour market experience 
has a similar positive effect of around 15 per cent (ten-year effect) in both these two 
types of workplaces. These findings clearly provide support to the two propositions 
set earlier in the paper. What we observe here is that while firm seniority and 
specificity are important in the most structured and well-protected and secure 
environments, occupational expertise and the more competitive kind of skills play a 
major role in the less restricted and more demanding workplaces. Generally though 
in the union sector, it is seniority, measured either by tenure or labour market 
experience, which has an important role in the wage determination process. Total 
labour market experience, although significant in both ‘types’ of union jobs, it 
appears to play a more important role when no formal policies are adopted. The 
absence of formal wage rules does not mean that informal, unwritten rules do not 
exist in these workplaces. In fact, it is quite likely that even in these union jobs   27
employers follow some kind of seniority rule concerning employment and wages. In 
jobs with no collective representation, apart from occupational expertise, labour 
market experience appears to have an important role on wages. It is interesting 
though to notice that the returns to labour market experience double in size (ten-
year effect) when seniority scales are applied, an indication that seniority in general 
is quite important when wage scales are adopted. Overall, the findings suggest that 
there are different earnings profiles depending on seniority scales and union 
representation. Especially though within the non-union sector the diversity is more 
obvious, probably because in union jobs even if formal wage policies do not exist, 
some kind of unwritten seniority rules should govern employers’ decisions.  
 
The findings here imply that the existence of formal wage scales and union 
representation in a workplace has a significant influence on the seniority and 
human-capital earnings profiles. More specifically, seniority appears to be quite 
important in workplaces with formal wage scale policies both in the union and non-
union sector. Furthermore, the estimates suggest that unionised jobs appreciate and 
reward seniority even when no pay-rise rules are adopted. A possible rationale is 
that in jobs with union representation even if no such formal policies exist, there 
probably are some unwritten seniority rules that govern employment and earnings 
determination. Non-union jobs with no incremental wage scales, on the other hand, 




In this paper we explore how institutional arrangements influence employees’ 
wages. Particularly, the focus of this examination is to distinguish the different paths 
seniority-earnings profiles follow depending on whether the individual is employed 
in a workplace where trade unions and collective bargaining are present and/or 
where formal wage scale rules are adopted. Trade unions are traditionally 
associated with the standardisation of pay-setting procedures, the enforcement of 
objectives rules concerning promotions and wages in the workplace and are 
generally hostile to Performance-Related Pay and individual merit schemes. Within 
this framework, we set two propositions related to seniority profiles and union 
representation. In particular, we argue that in the union sector it is expected that 
job seniority and skills specificity will be an important determinant of wages, while 
in the less structured non-union sector true productivity, proxied by the more   28
competitive accumulated skills and professional expertise, will have a key role on 
earnings profiles. Indeed our analysis on male employees verifies both propositions.  
 
Overall, it appears that senior workers, compared to their junior colleagues, are 
better off when covered by formal incremental scales, since seniority wage profiles 
are estimated to be steeper in these jobs. Furthermore, as the results suggest, formal 
wage rules are more likely to be adopted in workplaces with union representation. A 
theory that provides a rationale for this finding is the discriminating monopoly view 
discussed earlier in the paper. In this framework, a multi-part pricing policy that 
takes the form of seniority wages is adopted in order to achieve greater total income 
for the trade union (monopolist) and reduce turnover and quits of the more valued, 
senior workers from the employers’ point of view, in working environments where 
true productivity is difficult to measure. Nevertheless, there are indications that 
seniority plays a significant role even in union jobs with no such scales rules. One 
possible explanation, in the same spirit of this discussion, is that unwritten policies, 
which actually serve the same purposes as formal rules, are quite likely to be 
adopted in these union jobs. Occupational expertise, on the other hand, is highly 
rewarded in less restricted or structured environments, where individual 
productivity can be measured. The analysis implies that in jobs with no formal 
incremental scales, and especially in the non-union sector, employees’ wages are 
determined by their competitive accumulated, occupational-specific skills rather 
than their seniority. In conclusion, workplaces with union representation and 
formal seniority earnings policies ‘favour and protect’ their senior employees, while 
the more competitive non-union sector jobs are fairer in the sense that they reward 
the workers based on their true qualifications and output productivity. We believe 
that the discussion here generates some interesting findings concerning workers 
earnings profiles and unionism in the British labour market of the 1990s. Trade 
unions, in this era of declining membership and representation power, still ensure 
either through formal policies, or unwritten rules a structured and well-protected 
environment for all covered workers. 
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Sample Characteristics (BHPS): Waves 1-8 
   
No. of Individuals  985 
No. of Observations  5027 
No. of Employees in a Union Job  2964 
No. of Employees in a Non-Union Job  2063 
 Mean  (S.D.) 
 Union  Non-Union 






























Wage Equations & Unionism 
 OLS GLS(I)  GLS(II)  FE(I) FE(II) 
 1-dgt  2-dgt  1-dgt  2-dgt  1-dgt  2-dgt  1-dgt  2-dgt  1-dgt  2-dgt 
Union 































(.030)      








































Sample  2964 
Non-Union 
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Sample  2063 
Notes: Standard errors reported into brackets. In panel estimators (I), the identification unit is the 
individual. In panel estimators (II), the identification unit is the individual working for a particular 
employer.   35
 
Table 3 
Union Status Probit Model 
 1-digit  2-digit 
 dF/dx  z-stat.  dF/dx  z-stat. 
Human Capital      
Ten/10  .298 4.22 .307 4.27 
(Ten/10)2  -.139 -2.50 -.153 -2.71 
(Ten/10)3  .022 1.91 .027 2.22 
Exp  -.005 -1.43 -.005 -1.47 
Exp2  1.23e-04 1.52 1.33e-04 1.70 
IndExp  .009 1.59 .001 0.20 
IndExp2  -2.70e-04 -0.71  5.20e-04  1.27 
IndExp3  2.27e-06 0.34 -1.53e-05  -2.05 
Occexp  -.005 -0.84  .004  0.78 
Occexp2  3.66e-04 0.96 -3.79e-04  -0.96 
Occexp3  -8.04e-06 -1.18  6.28e-06  0.86 
Leave  5.58e-04 0.15 -7.31e-05  -0.02 
Region      
London  .018 0.59 .012 0.38 
North  .087 4.01 .085 3.93 
Midlands  .019 0.85 .017 0.79 
Wales  .073 1.84 .074 1.85 
Scotland  -.020 -0.61 -.016 -0.47 
Political Beliefs      
Conservative  .045 2.08 .047 2.18 
Labour  .157 7.83 .159 7.92 
Liberal Dem.  .101 3.37 .107 3.56 
Industry Sector      
SIC 2  -.345 -6.76 -.352 -6.89 
SIC 3  -.406 -9.65 -.396 -9.38 
SIC 4  -.297 -6.75 -.299 -6.80 
SIC 5  -.201 -3.94 -.209 -4.11 
SIC 6  -.419 -9.37 -.417 -9.32 
SIC 7  .042 0.91 .036 0.79 
SIC 8  -.256 -5.53 -.254 -5.50 
SIC 9  .171 4.24 .171 4.24 
Firm Size (ascending)        
Firm Size 2  .109 1.41 .108 1.40 
Firm Size 3  .101 3.93 .097 3.78 
Firm Size 4  .191 7.73 .187 7.58 
Firm Size 5  .203 8.23 .199 8.09 
Firm Size 6  .309 14.26 .309 14.25 
Firm Size 7  .322 13.70 .321 13.65 
Firm Size 8  .348 14.35 .349 14.41 
Occupation      
SOC 2  .082 2.60 .085 2.70 
SOC 3  .058 1.49 .066 1.68 
SOC 4  .107 2.32 .110 2.39 
SOC 5  .107 2.06 .109 2.11 
SOC 6  .148 3.13 .144 3.04 
SOC 7  .029 0.56 .039 0.77 
SOC 8  .173 3.50 .176 3.59 
SOC 9  .252 4.37 .256 4.46 
Skills      
Semi-Skilled  .182 3.07 .179 3.03 
High-Skilled  .189 2.98 .187 2.94 
Foreman  .102 1.58 .101 1.56   36
(Table 3 continued). 
Non-Manual  .185 2.85 .183 2.82 
Prmg  .042 0.58 .046 0.63 
Qualifications      
High-Degree  .082 1.42 .089 1.57 
First-Degree  -.030 -0.67 -.031 -0.70 
Teaching Qual.  .090 1.34 .093 1.39 
Higher Qual.  .043 1.50 .045 1.60 
Nursing Qual.  .118 0.77 .137 0.89 
A-Level  .117 3.74 .118 3.78 
O-Level  .030 1.06 .034 1.21 
Commql  -.086 -0.67 -.100 -0.78 
CSE  -.010 -0.25 -.009 -0.21 
Apprent  -.087 -1.68 -.091 -1.79 
Other Qual.  .164 1.91 .168 1.97 
Time Trend      
Wave  -.021 -5.45 -.021 -5.47 
Sample  5027      
Notes: Derived marginal effects. 
 
Table 4 
Wages Equation Corrected for Selectivity 
 Union    Non-Union 
 1-dgt  2-dgt    1-dgt  2-dgt 
T10  .040 
(.023) 
.040 




Exp10  .189 
(.022) 
.202 




Ind10  .004 
(.023) 
-.004 




Occ10  .045 
(.021) 
.039 




rho  .025 
(.131) 
.035 




LR-test (X2)  0.03 0.07    17.83 22.07 
Sample  2964     2063   
Notes: Standard errors into brackets. 
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Table 5 
Wage Equations & Seniority Scales 
 OLS GLS(I)  GLS(II)  FE(I) FE(II) 
 1-dgt  2-dgt  1-dgt  2-dgt  1-dgt  2-dgt  1-dgt  2-dgt  1-dgt  2-dgt 
Pay-Rise 
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Sample  2233 
No Pay-Rise 
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Sample  2780 
Notes: Standard errors reported into brackets. In panel estimators (I), the identification unit is the 






Pay-rise Probit Model (Male Employees) 
 1-digit  2-digit 
 dF/dx  z-stat.  dF/dx  z-stat. 
Trade Unions      
Union  .201 11.29 .201 11.27 
Human Capital      
Ten/10  .033 0.51 .068 1.05 
(Ten/10)2  -.014 -0.29 -.042 -0.88 
(Ten/10)3  .002 0.24 .008 0.83 
Exp  -.012 -3.19 -.011 -3.20 
Exp2  1.45e-04 1.89 1.37e-04 1.85 
IndExp  -.017 -2.89 -.020 -3.52 
IndExp2  .001 3.66 .001 3.53 
IndExp3  2.61e-05 -3.87 -2.59e-05 -3.38 
Occexp  .012 2.22 .007 1.22 
Occexp2  -9.12e-04 -2.44 -3.67e-04 -.092 
Occexp3  1.56e-05 2.31 4.80e-06 0.64 
Leave  -.007 -1.89 -.006 -1.67 
Region      
London  -.012 -0.40 -.007 -0.26 
North  -.074 -3.59 -.079 -3.83 
Midlands  -.068 -3.20 -.068 -3.24 
Wales  -.057 -1.51 -.062 -1.65 
Scotland  -.034 -1.13 -.038 -1.24   38
 
(Table 6 continued). 
Industry Sector      
SIC 2  -.099 -2.17 -.099 -2.17 
SIC 3  -.203 -5.52 -.201 -5.48 
SIC 4  -.144 -3.77 -.140 -3.68 
SIC 5  -.073 -1.57 -.077 -1.67 
SIC 6  -.122 -3.02 -.128 -3.15 
SIC 7  -.171 -4.32 -.174 -4.40 
SIC 8  -.192 -4.83 -.197 -4.98 
SIC 9  .049 1.28 .047 1.24 
Firm Size (ascending)        
Firm Size 2  .043 0.51 .042 0.49 
Firm Size 3  .031 1.15 .029 1.09 
Firm Size 4  .077 2.88 .078 2.92 
Firm Size 5  .071 2.60 .070 2.57 
Firm Size 6  .116 4.57 .117 4.59 
Firm Size 7  .148 4.91 .151 5.01 
Firm Size 8  .183 6.27 .183 6.28 
Occupation      
SOC 2  .174 5.47 .158 4.93 
SOC 3  .064 1.66 .052 1.34 
SOC 4  .005 0.12 -.015  -0.33 
SOC 5  -.055 -1.05 -.072 -1.39 
SOC 6  .003 0.07 -.006  -0.13 
SOC 7  -.005 -0.10 -.018 -0.36 
SOC 8  -.053 -1.02 -.074 -1.45 
SOC 9  .037 0.60 .021 0.34 
Skills      
Semi-Skilled  .079 1.38 .089 1.55 
High-Skilled  .080 1.28 .078 1.24 
Foreman  .077 1.24 .076 1.23 
Non-Manual  .135 2.10 .137 2.15 
Prmg  .043 0.62 .048 0.69 
Qualifications      
High-Degree  -.186 -3.52 -.201 -3.84 
First-Degree  -.062 -1.53 -.070 -1.72 
Teaching Qual.  .006 0.10 .012 0.20 
Higher Qual.  -.026 -0.97 -.029 -1.07 
Nursing Qual.  .101 0.69 .120 0.82 
A-Level  -.021 -0.68 -.026 -0.83 
O-Level  -.048 -1.78 -.049 -1.79 
Commql  -.025 -0.23 -.028 -0.25 
CSE  -.155 -4.15 -.154 -4.13 
Apprent  .066 1.29 .063 1.24 
Other Qual.  .045 0.56 .047 0.59 
Time Trend      
Wave  -.021 -5.94 -.020 -5.70 
Sample  5013      
Notes: Derived marginal effects. 
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Table 7 
Earnings, Unionism & Seniority Scales 
  Union Non-Union 
 1-dgt  2-dgt  1-dgt  2-dgt 
Pay-Rise      








































LR test (X2)  0.57 0.35  12.87  11.78 
Sample  1670   563  
No Pay-Rise       








































LR test (X2)  1.26 1.13 6.32  8.49 
Sample  1292  1488   
Notes: Standard errors into brackets. 






























Table A.1  
  Industry Classification (1-digit) 
SIC1  Agriculture, Forestry & Fishing; Energy & Water Supplies 
SIC2  Extraction of Minerals & Ores (other than fuels); Manufacture of 
Metals, Mineral Products & Chemicals 
SIC3  Metal Goods, Engineering & Vehicles Industries 
SIC4  Other Manufacturing Industries 
SIC5  Construction 
SIC6  Distribution, Hotels & Catering (Repairs) 
SIC7  Transport & Communication 
SIC8  Banking, Finance, Insurance, Business Services & Leasing 
SIC9  Other Services 
 
Table A.2 
  Occupational Classification (1-digit) 
SOC1  Managers & Administrators 
SOC2  Professional Occupations 
SOC3  Associate Professional & Technical Occupations 
SOC4  Clerical & Secretarial Occupations 
SOC5  Craft & Related Occupations 
SOC6  Personal & Protective Service Occupations 
SOC7  Sales Occupations 
SOC8  Plant & Machine Operatives 
SOC9  Other Occupations 
 